Admiral Research · The forces reshaping the industry · Jul 2026

Marinas: The Birth of an Institutional Asset Class

The price arbitrage in marinas is over. The driver of returns has shifted from the entry price of the asset to the performance of the business, and almost no one is ready.

By John Howie, Co-Founder · led investment strategy at Michael Bloomberg’s family office

Sitting with the general manager of a 400-slip marina, I watched the phone ring out eight times in an hour. He wasn’t careless. He was alone. Every one of those calls was a boater ready to spend money, and every missed one became someone else’s revenue.

I spent a decade as an institutional investor, leading investment strategy at Michael Bloomberg’s family office, and I watched the same pattern repeat across one asset class after another: once the cheap assets are gone, the return comes from running the business better, and it goes to whoever can actually operate at scale. Almost no one can, because operating that reliably has never been a system. It has only ever been a person, and the best of it walked out the door the day they left. Marinas are at that inflection now, further along than the industry realizes, so I left to build the operating layer this shift demands.

The initial unlock was regulatory. A series of IRS rulings between 2013 and 2019 confirmed that boat-slip income qualifies for REIT treatment, which let a public REIT like Sun Communities acquire Safe Harbor in 2020. More than any operator, Safe Harbor turned marina consolidation into an institutional asset class, building the largest marina portfolio in the world one dock at a time. By now the bull case is well rehearsed, and every investment memo cites the same fundamentals: finite waterfront, slip waitlists, sticky owners, occupancy that held even through 2008. It is all true, and it is all priced in.

Blackstone was the watershed. When the largest alternative-asset manager in the world pays $5.65 billion for a marina portfolio at roughly 21 times estimated 2024 FFO, per Sun Communities, a multiple reserved for core infrastructure, it confirms what a handful of investors already believed. And it is far from alone. CVC sold D-Marin to InfraVia with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley advising; Southern Marinas was recapitalized by Stonepeak; Bain raised a fund aimed squarely at the space. From Carlyle to Guggenheim, and the sovereign wealth funds and family offices among them, the roster runs deep, much of it invested long before it was obvious. With even McKinsey now publishing on marinas, the consensus is set. The interesting question is what happens next.

The institutionalization curve

Every fragmented, operator-run real-asset class consolidates on one arc. Marinas are a decade behind.

Source: true

How this always plays out

We have seen this movie before. Every fragmented, hands-on real asset institutionalizes in four waves, and how value is created shifts with each one.

Wave 1: The Pioneers
A few operators start buying marinas from the families who built them. There was no price discovery and no playbook, so the earliest buyers were working out what these assets were even worth. In marinas the pioneers included a select few, among them Westrec, launched in 1987 by a self-storage executive, and IGY, from 2005.
Wave 2: The Early Movers
A playbook emerges and a broader set of operators moves in, buying at high cap rates and lifting under-market rates to market. That mispricing is the return, captured before the rest of the market catches on. Suntex, from 2007, and Safe Harbor, from 2015, built the largest platforms, and a host of others followed.
Wave 3: The Flood
Institutional capital pours in and cap rates compress. Fund after fund has followed the early movers, and everyone is hunting. The structural bargain is gone: assets change hands at what they are worth. Marinas are here today. The word is out, owners know what they hold, and no one is selling for pennies anymore.
Wave 4: Standardization
The obvious levers, resetting rates and upland development, are the ones everyone is already looking at, and they only go so far. The last real edge is operational, and the hardest to execute: making the whole business perform, so the best property’s results hold at every other one, not just where a star GM happens to work. Everyone has underwritten this; no one has operationalized it into a repeatable playbook. That is the frontier, and where the next dominant platform will be made.

Buying cheap and marking rates to market were the entire return. Both are spent. What is left is running the business better.

Return drivers, then and now

Source: Illustrative and directional, not a measured decomposition. Shown in the standard per-asset value-creation frame: entry price, marking rates to market, operational NOI. Portfolio multiple expansion from scale, upland development, and capex sit outside this frame.

The old levers are spent

There are no more cheap marinas, and rates are already marked to market. Pushing them further only collides with boaters whose expectations have gone unmet for years. Development or capex, the other obvious moves, demand fresh capital and years of execution. The lever hiding in plain sight demands neither: operating the marina you already own, better. That is capital-light NOI growth on an asset in hand, and it is exactly the opening.

The gaps no one is closing

The gaps are broad and concrete, and it helps to take one clear example: the phone. People call a marina to learn about it and to spend money, and no form or website, however slick, has changed that. When a boater is ready, they pick up the phone. The money is on the phone lines, and marinas cannot keep up. In a study of 150 marinas, nearly 40% of peak-season calls went unanswered, and when no one called back, that demand simply never got through.

40% of peak-season calls go unanswered across a study of 150 marinas. In this asset class, that is not an operations problem. It is the return.

Even the basics are hard to see. Most operators cannot reliably quantify how many inquiries came in across all channels in a given week, what their follow-up rate is, what share converted, or why the rest walked. The existing tools do not help. They were built to store the business, not to run it: sticky notes, and legacy software that talks to nothing else and captures only what an on-site team remembers to enter. So no one knows the true conversion rate, how one property compares to the portfolio, or where in the cycle it breaks down. These are the direct drivers of occupancy, revenue, and NOI, the very return the capital is chasing.

The software marinas run today has made it harder, not easier. Operations were never where this industry competed, and a decade of software has only deepened the gap: a decade ago a marina GM ran the business from the docks; today, by our count, a GM spends nearly 90% of the day behind a screen, feeding systems that try to track the business and run none of it.

None of this is new. For decades, what boaters expect has outrun what marinas deliver, and that widening deficit, unanswered, unmeasured, unmanaged, is the whole opportunity.

Capital did not create the opportunity. Neglected demand did.

The operator is the alpha

That deficit is where beta ends and alpha begins. Beta is the fundamentals everyone underwrites: scarce waterfront, sticky demand, the tide that lifts every marina and is already in the price. Alpha is what a given operator adds on top: the NOI it creates by running the business better than the marina next door. From here, it is what decides returns. And the leverage is enormous: at today’s multiples, $1 of NOI is worth about $20 of enterprise value, so $500K in new NOI, hardly heroic when 40% of calls go unanswered, creates roughly $10M in value. And it is capital-light: it comes from running the business better, not from dredging, new docks, or upland development.

Velocity beats the bargain

The stall is clearest in the middle of the market. Below the few large platforms sit dozens of mid-sized marina portfolios, and every one knows that reaching scale compresses their cap rate. So each wants to buy the next marina, but with nothing cheap left to buy, the pace of acquisitions slows, and the roll-up that would get them to scale never gains speed.

The way out is not a better price. It is a different way to underwrite: pricing the operational upside before the purchase and, the most important part, delivering it after. That lets an operator pay the market rate for a marina as it stands, because they can see the NOI waiting inside it: the closed revenue leakage, the operational clarity, the better conversions. Then they go capture it. That is what lets the winners buy at velocity while everyone else waits for a discount that no longer exists. And velocity is the only way to capture the scale premium itself: the cap-rate compression that comes with getting bigger goes to whoever can actually assemble the portfolio, not to whoever waits for a cheaper entry.

Standardize outcomes, not software

Every buyer now says the same two words, digital transformation, and nearly all mean the same thing by it: rip out one legacy system, train everyone on another, with a long-standing plan to unify everything over time. The cost is tremendous: retraining, new-tool fatigue, migration meetings. But it changes almost nothing about the business outcomes. Two restaurants running the same register do not turn the same profit, and two marinas running the same software do not perform the same.

Real standardization links the complete chain together, from the inquiry to the follow-up to the conversion to the financial result, until the best property’s performance becomes the standard at every other one, no matter who is working the dock. It is the standardization of operating outcomes, what each marina achieves on the ground, not of software.

None of this is what the last decade of marina software was built to do, and it is not something software can be upgraded into. A system of record is passive by design: it waits for someone to type in what already happened. It cannot answer the call, run the follow-up, or close the loop, because doing the work was never its job. Wave four needs the opposite: a new kind of system, one that produces the outcome rather than filing it after the fact.

And done across a portfolio, standardization compounds. Instrumented, consistent operations turn a group of marinas into something no single one can be: demand seen at one property can be routed to another, the pricing and conversion learned at one sharpen every other, and each new marina makes the whole network smarter. That is a moat that widens with scale. The operator who orchestrates it pulls away from the field, and the first to get there is the hardest to catch.

Who wins from here

An institution does not underwrite one marina. It underwrites the confidence that the next set of acquisitions perform like the first.

That confidence is what capital is actually buying, and it is what scales: an economic model that grows with every acquisition rather than resetting. It turns a collection of one-off, idiosyncratic assets into a real platform, and a fair price into an exceptional return.

Marinas have arrived as an institutional asset class. Who wins its final stage, professionalizing and scaling the operating playbook, has not been decided. It will be the operators who understand what most have missed: that the return, from here, is earned in the business, not the purchase; that boater demand, unmet for decades and still growing, is the true catalyst; and that the edge comes not from the systems you adopt, but from the commercial outcomes you produce.

So if you are allocating capital here, the move is no longer to wait for a cheaper entry. It is to underwrite the operational upside before you buy, and to build the capability to capture it reliably, at every property. That is what we built Admiral to do, and it is why I left the institutional side to build it. The operators who understand this will define the next decade of this asset class.